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http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/KahnPublicNuclearStrategyWohlstetter.pdfKahn called total disarmament utopian:
It has probably always been impractical to imagine a completely disarmed world, and the introduction of the thermonuclear bomb has added a special dimension to this impracticality. Given the large nuclear stockpiles in the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British Isles, it would be child’s play for one of these nations to hide completely hundreds of these bombs….The violator would then have an incredible advantage if the agreement ever broke down and the arms race started again …. Even if the problem of what we may call the “clandestine cache” were solvable … one could not disarm the world totally and expect it to remain disarmed. But the problem of the clandestine nuclear cache itself makes total disarmament especially infeasible.
Kahn listed six desirable characteristics of a deterrent: (1) frightening; (2) inexorable; (3) persuasive; (4) cheap; (5) non-accident prone; (6) controllable.
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Type I deterrence is the deterrence of a direct attack….Type II deterrence is defined as using strategic threats to deter an enemy from engaging in very provocative acts, other than a direct attack on the United States itself …. Type III deterrence might be called tit-for-tat, graduated or controlled deterrence.
Regarding types of deterrence, Kahn offered three “conceptualized devices”:
(1) Doomsday Machine—automatic world destruction response to Type II or Type III provocations by an adversary; (2) Doomsday in a Hurry Machine—alerting prospective attackers that an attack will trigger Doomsday in response to specified Type II or Type III provocations; (3) Homicide Pact Machine—automatic world destruction response to direct Type I nuclear attack.
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Kahn on escalation in brief:
In a typical escalation situation, there is likely to be a “competition in risk-taking,” or at least resolve, and a matching of local resources, in some form of limited conflict between two sides. Usually, either side could win by increasing its efforts in some way, provided the other side did not negate the increase by increasing its own efforts….. The fear that the other side may react, indeed overreact, is most likely to deter escalation, and not the undesirability or costs of the escalation itself.
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Note: Part of the fun in diplomacy mode is to see how long the world of Defcon and its six players can "maintain the peace". -----
On the difficulty of restoring the tradition and custom of nonuse after first nuclear use:
More important, in a world in which there is no legislature to set new rules, and the only method of changing rules is through a complex and unreliable systems-bargaining process, each side should—other things being equal—be anxious to preserve whatever thresholds there are. This is a counsel of prudence, but a serious one: it is not often possible to restore traditions, customs or conventions that have been shattered. Once they are gone, or weakened, the world may be “permanently” worse off.
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Note: Likewise in Defcon, we count down from Defcon 5 to Defcon 1. Once we reach Defcon 1, we stay at Defcon 1 for the rest of the time, never do we revert back to a non-use stance. “permanently” worse off == Everybody Dies -----
On US or Soviet first strike not targeting civilians:
Civilians are not high-priority military targets, whatever the present importance of city attacks in deterrence. The nation that strikes first is likely—initially, at least—to wish to preserve its opponent’s civilians, both in order not to provoke retaliation and to preserve hostages.
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Note: This only applies if the scoring mode is survivor, if it is "default", then all bets are off. -----
On de-escalation as being different from escalation:
De-escalation also differs from escalation in that it is harder to force a suitable response. It is not really true that it takes two to make a quarrel; only one side need be aggressive in order to generate some certainty of a quarrel. But it usually does take two to make an agreement (barring total surrender by one side).
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Note: After Defcon 1 once the action starts it is often hard to stop. When nukes start flying around they often don't disarm. In all my years of playing Defcon I've probably seen all but two instances where a player would use the "disarm" functionality on his nuclear missiles. -----
On the impact of nuclear weapons, atomic & hydrogen bombs, on strategy & tactics:
When the atom bomb was developed, many scholars, military professionals, and informed laymen believed that strategy and tactics, as they understood them, had come to an end. This feeling was reflected in the late 1940’s in such phrases as “the absolute weapon,” and in many aphorisms and analogies that made the point, more or less dramatically or ironically, that the inevitable result of a nuclear war would be mutual annihilation. Since this would happen no matter what tactics were used, tactical theory was irrelevant. Strategy was equally irrelevant, since it could not be an objective of strategy to ring about the destruction of the nation. Atomic war thus became unthinkable, both literally and figuratively.
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Exactly my point. 
) but i think a gree with it. This is partly my strategy when i play defcon. Especially in diplo mod. Why? Because my aim is not to tale civilians (others can take it -seeing their position in the score- instead of me). What does that means? That means simply that i try to focuse first on the gretaer threat on me. And try to destroy as soon as possible every system of response. (fleet, facilities above all and first). What do you except to do against me when you have nothing to hit? The game is over, even before to have tried to answer.
